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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
COLYER V. SHEFFINGTON.1
In the case of Colyer v. Sheffington, we have a writ of
habeas corpus commanding the Commissioner of Immigra-
tion to show cause why certain aliens held for deportation
should not be given their liberty.
The facts were these: In the summer of 1919, the Socialist
Party split, and as an offshoot the Communists and the Com-
munist Labor Parties were formed. The Department of
Justice made the determination that alien membership in
either party constituted sufficient ground for deportation.2
A wholesale raid was planned whereby the aliens and evi-
dence of their affiliation with the Communist or Communist
Labor Party would be secured. Through a system of spies,
"under cover informants" within the parties, meetings gen-
erally were called for the night of January 2, 1920, and the
assemblies were raided. Four hundred and forty aliens were
thus sent to Deer Island for deportation proceedings to be
in form and record by the Department of Labor, though in
effect predetermined by the Department of Justice. As a
result of these proceedings, the petitioners were held for
deportation.
We may well classify the issues under two heads: First,
has an alien held for deportation a right to the writ of
habeas corpus; and, second, what acts of the deportation
are reviewable on habeas corpus? In considering the first
main issue, we have as established law that there is no consti-
tutional restriction upon the power of Congress to expel
aliens. An invitation once extended to an alien to come within
our borders may be withdrawn, for he has no vested right to
remain.8 Aliens do, however, have the constitutional right
under the Fifth Amendment not to be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.4 And aliens who are
deprived of their liberty through deportation proceedings
may have their legal right to liberty tested on habeas corpu
proceedings.
1. 265 Fed. 17.
2. The Department of Labor adopted this determination.
3. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581.
4. 118 U. S. 356.
5. Whitfleld v. Hangers, 222 Fed. 745.
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With the right to the writ of habeas corpus established,
we are next concerned with the determination of the acts of
the deportation proceedings of the Department of Labor that
are conclusive, and of those that are reviewable by the court
on habeas corpus." Although the administration of the im-
migration laws has been intrusted by Congress to the De-
partment of Labor, and under the immigration laws authority
is vested in the Secretary of Labor to provide rules and regu-
lations for enforcing the provisions of the acts ;7 and although
this case is the testing by the writ of habeas corpus of the
acts of an administrative tribunal that has been given AB-
SOLUTE AUTHORITY by Congress, decisions of all ad-
ministrative tribunals are reviewable where the requirements
of DUE PROCESS OF LAW have NOT been observed.
An examination of the deportation proceedings affecting
the petitioners brings one to the conclusion that due process
of law was not observed:
On December 31, 1919, before the raid, and two days after
the date of a CONFIDENTIAL letter from the acting Sec-
retary of Labor to the Boston Commissioner of Immigration
setting forth the plan of the proposed raid, there was a change
made by said acting Secretary of Labor of a rule for the con-
ducting of hearings (Rule 22, Subdivision 5b). It previously
read: "At the beginning of the hearing under the warrant
of arrest, the alien shall be allowed to inspect the warrant
of arrest and all the evidence on which it was issued, and
shall be apprised that he may be represented by counsel."
This rule was changed to read: "Preferably at the be-
ginning of the hearing under the warrant of arrest, or, at
any rate, as soon as the hearing has proceeded sufficiently
in the development of facts to protect the government's in-
6. An outline of the acts of an administrative tribunal which will be
considered on habeas corpus proceedings will be found in an article by E. H.
Grimm in 3 St. Louis Law Review 140.
7. Judge Anderson clearly states that the Department of Justice has
no more to do with the administration of the Immigration laws than does
the Department of Interior, but the information once in the hands of the
Department of Labor, it is Immaterial from whence it came, and that the
deportation proceedings are not void ab initio. The further activity of the
Department of Justice may, however, prevent a fair trial, or "due process of
law."
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terests, the alien shall be allowed to inspect the warrant of
arrest and evidence on which it was issued and thereafter
may be represented by counsel." On January 28, 1920, about
a month after the modification of the rule, and after MOST
OF THE HEARINGS OF THE ALIENS NETTED ON
THE NIGHT OF January 2, 1920, WERE HAD, the Sec-
retary of Labor sent the following telegram to the Immigra-
tion Service in Boston: "By the direction of the Secretary,
the paragraph on the subject of hearings shall be restored
to the form in which it was previous to the admendment of
December 31, 1919."
Though we might go so far as to consider the proceedings
tainted with fraud, Judge Anderson considers it along with
the rest of the hearing as being a failure of "due process of
law.''8 Deliberately to plan to cut off these aliens from the
advice and assistance of counsel until they are involved in
apparent admissions that they are members of or affiliated
with an organization teaching the overthrow of this govern-
ment by force and violence, the practical equivalent of a
charge of treason if against citizens, is utterly inconsistent
with every notion involved in the conception of "due process
of law." As to the rights of the Secretary of Labor to change
the rule, Mr. Frankfurter, for the petitioners, puts it as fol-
lows: "Now, if there is one thing that is established in the
law of administration, I take it that it is that a rule cannot
be repealed specifically to affect a case under consideration
by the administrative tribunal; that is, if there is an existing
rule which protects certain rights, it violates every sense of
decency, which is the very heart of due process, to repeal
that protection just for the purpose of accomplishing the ends
8. The hearing was one of a non-English speaking people, say a Rus-
sian peasant, arrested suddenly in the night without any warrant or explan,
ation of the arrest, and given no instructions except to answer a set of
questions which were meant to secure a confession of membership in the
Communists or Communist Labor Party. In this frightened state, after
being held first in jail, then in the city prison at Deer Island, they were
called tc the hearing where they had no counsel, and often an interpreter,
whom they could but partly understand, and here the inspector was assisted
by agents of the Department of Justice, who had stringent instructions from
the Department to make every possible effort to obtain evidence of the alien's
membership in one of the proscribed parties.
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of the case which has come before the administrative author-
ity.'' To that, Judge Anderson says, the Government gave
no convincing answer.
As to the decision that membership in the Communist or
('ommunist Labor Party was sufficient ground for deporta-
tion, we find that by the Act of October 16, 1918, the pertinent
part of which follows: "Aliens who are members of or affili-
ateol with any organization that entertains a belief in, teaches
or advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the gov-
ernment of the United States * ' ' shall upon the war-
rant of the Secretary of Labor be taken into custody and
deported in the manner provided in the Immigration Act of
February 5, 1917." The Secretary of Labor ruled that the
Communist Party is a "force or violence" party within the
meauing of the foregoing act. What is meant by "force or
violence" party, being the interpretation of a statute, is a
question of law and reviewable. The determination whether
or not the Communist Party comes within the interpretation
is a mixed question of law and fact, but whether there were
sufficient facts before the Secretary of Labor that the Com-
munist Party is a "force or violence" party is a sufficiently
separate question of law for the Court to review.'0 Judge
Anderson ruled, though with a flinching of doubt," that the
Communist Party advocates the "general strike" as their
political weapon, and that the "general strike" is not "force
or violence" for the "overthrow" of the government, as laid
down in the Act of October 16, 1918. This case has been
appealed to the Supreme Court, and we wait with much in-
terest the final ruling on this point.' 2
EZRA LOCKHART.
9. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U. S. 3.
10. Am. School of Magnetic Iealing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S, 94.
11. Judge Anderson infers that were it possible he would refer the
case to the Supreme Court without a decision but states that such is not
possible, and that he must first render a decision and the proper appeal must
be taken.
12. Judge Knox, district judge for the Second Circuit in New York, has
since ruled that the Communist Party is a party advocating the overthrow
of the government by "force and violence" through means of the "general
strike."
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